The Dispersion-Correlation Map

“All happy families are alike; every unhappy family is unhappy in its own way”
– Tolstoy, Anna Karenina

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

- In the past two decades, equities have gone through two major bear markets: the bursting of the technology bubble in 2000-2002 and the financial crisis of 2008.

- Although the two events seem superficially similar, the nature of the market's volatility was quite different in 2008 relative to 2000-2002.

- We introduce the dispersion-correlation map as a heuristic for understanding market volatility.

- All bear markets are unpleasant, but 2008 was especially so, given the very high correlations among equity securities.

- Today’s environment shows no resemblance to either of the past two bear market episodes.

CONTEXT

Over the past 25 years, the S&P 500® has returned a cumulative 940% (10% annually). However, the market’s climb was not a steady one (see Exhibit 1). Since 1991, equities have gone through two major bear markets: the bursting of the technology bubble in 2000-2002 and the financial crisis of 2007-2008. The S&P 500 declined 38% in calendar years 2000-2002 and 37% in 2008 alone.
A future analyst might look back at the technology bust and the 2008 financial crisis and conclude they were essentially the same.

These two events seem superficially similar, starting with the magnitude of the decline. Both were major distresses following sustained gains in the S&P 500, and in both cases volatility rose (see Exhibit 2). It’s not hard to imagine a young analyst, 50 years from now, looking at both episodes and concluding that they were essentially the same. But he would be wrong.

A TALE OF TWO CRISES

What our putative analyst missed is that the nature of the market’s volatility was quite different in 2008 compared with 2000-2002. More specifically, the deflation of the technology bubble was accompanied by the highest equity dispersion ever seen and below-average correlations. The 2008 global financial crisis saw above-average dispersion but with very high correlations.

Exhibit 3 illustrates the basic framework, which we call a dispersion-correlation map. Correlation is a measure of timing—it tells us whether the components of an index move in the same direction at the same time. Dispersion is a measure of magnitude. It tells us by how much the return of the average stock differs from the overall market’s return.\(^2\) If a market’s tendency for co-movement (correlation) is constant, but the magnitude of individual stocks’ fluctuations (dispersion) rises, market volatility will rise. Similarly, if the tendency for co-movement increases, then even with constant dispersion, market volatility will rise.\(^3\)

Exhibit 3: Dispersion-Correlation Map

Correlation

Dispersion

Higher Volatility

Lower Volatility

Source: S&P Dow Jones Indices. Chart is provided for illustrative purposes.

Whether correlation and dispersion are sources of volatility, or manifestations of volatility, is an interesting philosophical question.\(^4\) What


\(^3\) Edwards, Tim and Craig J. Lazzara, “At the Intersection of Diversification, Volatility and Correlation,” April 2014. Note that, for these purposes, correlation measures the average correlation of each stock in an index with every other stock in the index.

\(^4\) In the same vein, are the sides of a right triangle the source of the hypotenuse or a manifestation of the hypotenuse (and its adjacent angles)? This is another philosophical question that need not detain us here.
is important for our purposes is to understand that in a dispersion-correlation map like Exhibit 3, **points close to the origin are associated with lower volatility, and points farther from the origin are associated with higher volatility.** One empirical confirmation of this relationship can be found in the cross-sectional volatility of the sectors of the S&P 500.\(^5\)

We can also find evidence for this relationship by examining time series data. Exhibit 4 graphs dispersion and correlation for the S&P 500 on a rolling 12-month basis (corresponding to the graph of S&P 500 volatility in Exhibit 2). Notice that dispersion tends to run in a fairly narrow channel (between roughly 20% and 25% at annual rates) except during two significant exceptions around the time of the technology bubble and the financial crisis. Correlation tends to fluctuate more and appears to have drifted upward since the lows of the 1990s.

**Exhibit 4: S&P 500 Dispersion and Correlation**

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Exhibit 5 gathers the data of Exhibit 4 into annual averages to form a dispersion-correlation map. Each point on the map represents the average of 12 monthly dispersion and correlation observations for the year in question. (The dotted lines simply show us the median levels of dispersion and correlation.) Given what we observed in Exhibit 4, it’s not surprising that dispersion in most years hovers around 20%. However, there are two major exceptions to this tendency.

In the lower right quadrant of Exhibit 5, we find 1998, 1999, 2000, and 2001: the center of the inflation and deflation of the technology bubble. Dispersion in those years was extremely high, but correlation was well below average. In the upper right quadrant is 2008: a period of well-above average dispersion and very high correlations.

**WHY THIS MATTERS**

All bear markets are unpleasant, but those of the 2008 variety are especially so. The difficulty comes from 2008’s elevated correlations, which tell us that there was considerable co-movement among S&P 500 components. In 2000-2002, in contrast, correlations were dramatically lower, suggesting a below-average tendency toward co-movement. Furthermore, 2000-2002’s elevated dispersion tells us that there was a large gap between the best and the worst performers.

In a bear market of the 2000-2002 type, there are potentially places for an investor to hide. Below-average co-movement suggests that not all stocks were declining, and very high dispersion tells us that there was considerable room to add value relative to the market’s average performance. In 2008, the degree of co-movement left less latitude for defensive strategies to succeed.
Exhibit 6a, which compares the results of several such strategies during both periods, illustrates this point. In 2000-2002, despite the S&P 500’s -38% decline, at least some strategies achieved a positive total return. In 2008, on the other hand, the tendency for all stocks to move together (in this case, downward together) was much stronger. The higher dispersion in the earlier period means that the spread between defensive strategy returns and those of the S&P 500 was much greater than during the 2008 crisis (see Exhibit 6b). 6


The spread between defensive strategy returns and those of the S&P 500 was much greater in 2000-2002 than during the 2008 financial crisis.
Importantly, we can observe similar effects in equity markets outside the U.S. Exhibit 7 plots dispersion and correlation for the S&P Europe 350 (albeit for a shorter period). Although not identical to the U.S. pattern, 2000-2002 was a period of below-average correlation and very high dispersion; 2008 showed much higher correlations.

Exhibit 7: S&P Europe 350 Dispersion-Correlation Map

The correlation-dispersion map of the S&P 500 provides historical context for today's market dynamics.

We see similar patterns in Canada as well as Asia (see Appendix). The Asian narrative, however, also includes the regional financial crisis of 1997-1998. The average correlation in Asia for 1998 was even higher than in 2008.

WHERE ARE WE NOW?

This analysis may be of more than just historical interest. Market volatility is unavoidable, but understanding how dispersion and correlation have interacted can sometimes provide actionable current insight. Specifically, we have seen what the historical dispersion-correlation profiles of bear markets look like. What happens when we compare contemporary data to those profiles?

Exhibit 8 shows that at the beginning of 2016, U.S. equity correlations were very high, with dispersion at about median level. Historically, we have seen that high correlation can be worrisome; even without elevated dispersion, the S&P 500 looked potentially fragile at the beginning of this year. That fragility was manifested in January 2016's 5% decline for the S&P 500. Since that decline, however, the index's internal dynamics have shifted considerably. As of May 31, 2016, correlations had dropped dramatically and stood only slightly above their median level, and dispersion had also declined significantly.
We make no claims of market timing prescience based on the dispersion-correlation map, but Exhibit 8 does provide historical context for the market’s current dynamics. January 2016’s 5% decline might have signaled the start of an extended market decline. If that had occurred, and if historical precedents had prevailed, the index would have moved to the right on the dispersion-correlation map.

But it didn’t. The market’s volatility was resolved in a relatively benign way—correlations fell, dispersion declined, and six months later we find the index in a very different position on the dispersion-correlation map. In that sense, this analysis may provide some comfort to nervous investors.
APPENDIX

Exhibit 9: S&P/TSX Composite Dispersion-Correlation Map


Exhibit 10: S&P Pan Asia BMI Dispersion-Correlation Map

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